In order to adopt the restricted environment, such as radio frequency identification technology or sensor networking, which are the important components of the Internet of Things, lightweight block ciphers are designed. NUX is a 31-round iterative ultralightweight cipher proposed by Bansod et al. In this paper, we examine the resistance of NUX to differential and linear analysis and search for 1 ∼ 31-round differential characteristics and linear approximations. In design specification, authors claimed that 25-round NUX is resistant to differential and linear attack. However, we can successfully perform 29-round differential attack on NUX with the 22-round differential characteristic found in this paper, which is 4 rounds more than the limitation given by authors. Furthermore, we present the key recovery attack on 22-round NUX using a 19-round linear approximation determined in this paper. Besides, distinguishing attack, whose distinguisher is built utilizing the property of differential propagation through NUX, is implemented on full NUX with data complexity 8.
Introduction
The Internet of Things is defined as a variety of devices and technologies such as sensors, radio frequency identification (RFID) technology, global positioning systems, infrared sensors, laser scanners, and gas sensors. Its essence is to use RFID technology to realize the automatic identification of items, the interconnection, and sharing of information through the computer Internet. In this kind of new cryptography environment, RFID technology and sensor networking have similar properties, such as weak computation abilities, small storage spaces, and strict power constraints. Therefore, traditional block ciphers are not suitable for this kind of extremely constrained environment. Hence, lightweight block ciphers are put forward for restricted environment and have shown importance in various applications. Recently, copious lightweight block ciphers are designed to maintain security under limited resource conditions, such as PRESENT [1] , LBlock [2] , and PRINCE [3] . And many cryptographers are concerned about the security of lightweight block ciphers.
Differential analysis, which is a chosen-plaintext attack, is proposed by Biham and Shamir to analyze DES [4] . Differential analysis studies probability propagation property in the encryption/decryption process. This method seeks for high probability differential characteristics to perform a distinguishing attack or a key-recovery attack. Later, linear analysis, which is the duality of differential analysis and is a known-plaintext attack, is presented by Matsui in EURO-CRYPT'93 [5] . Similarly, linear analysis studies the linear relationship between plaintexts and ciphertexts and finds linear approximations with high probability to build a distinguisher or carry out a key-recovery attack. In addition, these two methods are the most popular cryptanalysis methods nowadays. They have been used to analyze many ciphers and should be taken into consideration for designing a new cipher scheme [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] .
NUX is a 31-round iterative lightweight block cipher proposed by Bansod et al. [12] which adopts generalized Feistel structure. And it supports 64-bit blocks and 80/128-bit keys. For the version with 128-bit key, the author pointed out that NUX needs 1022 GEs, which is less than all existing ciphers. In terms of security, they expected that NUX could resist differential/linear analysis. They examined the resistance of NUX against differential/linear cryptanalysis. At last, they showed that NUX cipher with no less than 25 round is enough to resist linear or differential attack. Besides, a biclique attack on NUX is presented in [12] .
Our Contribution
(i) 1∼31-round differential characteristics of NUX are searched for, and 10 25-round differential characteristics are found with probability 2 −71 , which are better than the one with probability limitation 2 −90 given in the design script, shown in Table 1 .
(ii) The resistance to the linear analysis for 1 ∼ 31-round NUX is examined, and 48 25-round linear approximations are presented with absolute value of bias to be 2 −41 better than the limitation on bias presented in the design script, which is 2 −66 , depicted in Table 1. (iii) For full NUX, the probability of the best differential characteristic is 2 −88 , and the absolute value of bias for the best linear approximation is 2 −50 , which are described in Table 1 and memory complexity 2 70 bytes. Till now, these two attacks are the best differential attack and best linear attack, respectively. A summary of our attacks is given in Table 2 .
(v) Utilizing the property of difference propagation through NUX, distinguishing attack can be implemented on full NUX with data complexity 8, which is depicted in Table 2 .
The organization of the paper is as follows. The notations and description of NUX are given in Section 2. Section 3 shows the differential characteristics and differential attack on 29-round NUX. In Section 4, the linear approximations and linear attack on 25-round NUX are introduced. Section 5 describes distinguishing attacks between full NUX and random permutations. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
Preliminaries
This section will list notations and operations used in this paper and describe NUX. . . Description of NUX. NUX is a 31-round ultralightweight cipher based on generalized Feistel network. It supports a key length of 128/80 bits and a block length of 64 bits. The round function is illustrated in Figure 1 .
. . Notations and Operations
There are two F-functions 1 and 2 , which are constructed by four 4 × 4 S-boxes and a circular shift operator. S-Box <<<8
rk' i The S-box is represented in Table 3 . Then 1 and 2 can be depicted as follows: 
The 64-bit input of the -th round, , is divided into 4 blocks of 16 bits, named 4 , 3 , 2 , and 1 , respectively.
and then there are the following formulas:
where is a 16-bit permutation, which is depicted in Table 4 . After 31 rounds, the ciphertext will be acquired as . The key schedule is omitted and interested readers are referred to [12] for more details about NUX.
Differential Attack on 29-Round NUX
In this section, how to search for differential characteristics of NUX will be described. And then a key-recovery attack is conducted on 29-round NUX.
. . Differential Characteristics of NUX.
To search for the differential characteristic of NUX, the different propagation between round functions should be considered. And how differences propagate through S-boxes should also be taken into account. When a difference passes through an S-box, the output difference and probability are determined by looking up the XOR difference distribution table (DDT) of the S-box.
Algorithm 1 is designed to search for differential characteristics of NUX, and notations used in this algorithm are depicted in Figure 2 . From the structure of NUX, it is obvious that the probability of one round can be 1; that is, all the 8 S-boxes are passive. So a special − 1-round differential characteristic, (Δ 3 0 = Δ 2 0 = 0), is chosen, and oneround differential characteristic with probability 1 is added to catch -round differential characteristics. Meanwhile, Δ 4 and Δ 3 , which lie in the two branches on the left side, will not affect Δ 2 and Δ 1 , the two branches on the right side, during propagation in NUX. So differences of two branches on the left or right are set to 0, and the difference propagation in the other two branches will be focused on during the encryption process. In this way, the number of active S-boxes is always no 
Input: S-box , Probability threshold
[30]. Output: A differential trail with the best probability.
(1) Generate the DDT of S-box.
(2) Store all 2, 4 and the corresponding input/output differences in DDT in the table (3) for Each of 8 S-boxes in the first round do (4) for all non-zero entities in DDT do (5) if S-box is in 2 then (6) Δ
Store them in [1] . (8) else ( The probability is recorded as [1] . (14) for ← 2 to 30 do
Travel to get Δ and its corresponding probability
Travel to get Δ ℎ and the corresponding probability more than 4 in one round, which can make the probability of the differential characteristic as large as possible. The results of our search algorithm are listed in Table 5 . Furthermore, the minimal numbers of active S-boxes of 1∼5-round differential characteristics are shown in the design manuscript [12] . So the minimal number of active S-boxes is also studied, and the minimum active S-boxes of 4 5-round differential characteristics are less than the ones given in [12] , which are presented in Table 6 .
. . Differential Attack on NUX. A 22-round differential characteristic is chosen with probability to be 2 −58 , which is shown in Table 7 , and 7 rounds are extended forward. The description is given in Figure 3 . There are Δ 
Linear Attack on 25-Round NUX
Linear approximations of NUX are searched for in this section, and the 25-round key-recovery attack is performed on NUX using a 19-round linear approximation.
. . Linear Approximations of NUX.
To search for linear approximations of NUX, how masks propagate through Sboxes should be taken into account. When a mask passes through an S-box, the linear approximation table (LAT) of the S-box is looked up to determine the output mask and bias. Algorithm 2 searches for linear approximations of NUX and notations used in this algorithm are depicted in Figure 4 .
The bias of one round can be 1/2, which can be obtained from the structure of NUX; that is, all the 8 S-boxes are passive. So special ( − 1)-round linear approximations are chosen, which satisfy (Γ 4 0 = Γ 1 0 = 0), and one-round linear approximation with bias 1 is added to catch -round linear approximations. Similar to searching for differential characteristics, there is only one active S-box in the first in the two branches on the left side, will not affect Γ 2 and Γ 1 , the two branches on the right side, during propagation in NUX. So the linear propagation on the left or right is taken into consideration, and differences of the other two branches are set to 0. In this way, the number of active Sboxes is always no more than 4 in one round, which can make the absolute value of the linear approximation bias as large as possible. The results of the search algorithm are listed in Table 8 .
Moreover, the minimal numbers of active S-boxes of 1∼5-round linear approximations are shown in the design manuscript [12] . And the minimal number of active S-boxes is also considered, and the minimum active S-boxes of 3∼5-round linear approximations are less than the ones given in [12] , which are presented in Table 9 .
. . Linear Attack on NUX. Utilizing obtained linear approximations, a key-recovery attack can be applied to 25-round NUX using a 19-round linear approximation with bias 2 −30 , which is described in Table 10 . The 19-round linear approximation is put from the 4th to the 22th round of NUX, extending 3 rounds both backward and forward. The 25-round key-recovery attack is shown in Figure 5 .
According to the linear approximation, there are Γ S-Box >>>3 S-Box <<<8 P P P P <<<8 >>>3
S-Box >>>3 S-Box <<<8
S-Box >>>3 S-Box <<<8 P P P P <<<8 >>>3
22-round Differential Distinguisher
S-Box S-Box for all non-zero entities in LAT do (5) if S-box is in 2 then (6) Γ
Store them in [1] . (8) else ( , and store them in [2] . (13) Update
The bias is recorded as [1] . (15) for ← 2 to 30 do
Travel to get Γ , V and its corresponding bias encryption. Hence, the total time complexity of this attack is about 2 126 25-round encryption.
Both the counters V 0 and V need 2 69 bytes to store, so the memory complexity for the attack is 2 70 bytes. The data complexity is 2 63.7 .
The success rate = Φ(2 √ ⋅ | | − √1 + /2 Φ −1 (1 − 2 − −1 )) = 88.21 by [14] .
Distinguishing Attack on NUX
Generally speaking, the distinguishing attack is a kind of test algorithm, which tries to perform the nonrandom behavior in cryptographic system. A distinguishing attack needs to find a distinguisher, which makes cryptographic algorithm different from random permutation. When analyzing NUX, we find a distinguisher with probability 1, that is, a deterministic distinguisher to distinguish NUX from a random permutation. In Section 3, it has been pointed out that the two branches on the right side will not affect the two on the right side during difference propagation in NUX. Then, for the fullround NUX, when the input difference (Δ ( * , * , 0, 0). However, the probability of the output difference to be ( * , * , 0, 0) is = 2 −32 for random permutations, when the input difference is (0, 0, * , * ). So 4 pairs of plaintexts are chosen, which are ( , ), (0 ≤ ≤ 3), and ⊕ = (0, 0, * , * ), and the corresponding ciphertexts ( , ) are checked to determine whether they satisfy ⊕ = ( * , * , 0, 0). The probability of obtaining such input/output differences is 1 for NUX, while it is 2 −128 for a random permutation. Therefore, we can distinguish NUX from a random permutation. Besides, there is another distinguisher with probability 1, which is ( * , * , 0, 0) =1 → 31-(0, 0, * , * ) and can be used to perform a distinguishing attack like the one described before. So we will not explore it here.
Since only 4 pairs of plaintexts are used in the distinguishing attack, the data complexity is 8. And the attack needs no storage. In other words, the complexity of memory is 0. The time complexity is 8 31-round encryptions.
Conclusions
NUX is a 31-round iterative ultralightweight cipher, which is suitable for extremely constrained environment and is applied to the Internet of Things. In this paper, differential and linear trails are searched for 1∼31-round NUX, which are better than those proposed in design specification. Moreover, a key-recovery attack on 29-round NUX is given with the 22-round differential characteristic found in the paper, whose time, data, and memory complexities are 2 121.73 29-round encryptions and 2 61 and 2 96 bytes, respectively. Meanwhile, using 22-round differential characteristic obtained in the paper, 29-round differential attack is performed with time, data, and memory complexities to be 2 126 25-round encryptions and 2 63.7 and 2 70 bytes, respectively. Furthermore, a distinguishing attack can be implemented on full NUX with data complexity 8. Results in this paper are the best ones on NUX till now.
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